

DIGITAL PROPAGANDA STRATEGIES OF THE HOUTHİ MOVEMENT

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Abstract: The present article uses the case study method to analyze the change in the digital propaganda strategies of the Houthi movement in the past three decades. Key aspects of the rebels’ online content are presented. Actually, it can be argued that the Houthis are one of the most forward-looking insurgent groups in the region as they have developed different types of media channels throughout the years: from printed leaflets to an official TV station to official accounts on various social networking platforms. Their propaganda strategies also transformed themselves in the past decades and successfully adapted to the requirements and expectations of the contemporary digital media ecosystem. The article outlines the key stages in the transformation processes of the above-mentioned propaganda dissemination strategy.

Keywords: conflict between Israel and Palestine, digital media, Houthi, propaganda, strategies, Yemen

Introduction and methodology

The beginning of the conflict between Israel and Palestine on 7 October 2023, gives impetus to a lot of events in all parts of the Middle East. Quickly after the onset of the war activities the Yemeni rebel Houthi movement took advantage from the mass dissatisfaction of Muslims against Israel’s politics. On 19 November 2023, the Houthis hijacked a commercial ship (the vessel “Galaxy Leader”) in the Red Sea. They have since launched dozens of missile and drone attacks

on commercial ships. Of these, 34 have resulted in reported damage to vessels. As a result, major shipping companies have stopped using the Red Sea - through which almost 15% of global seaborne trade usually passes - and are using a much longer route around southern Africa instead.

More important, however, is the shift that these vessels seizures caused to the Houthis' digital propaganda strategies. The movement's leaders realized the benefits of an active online presence and invited influencers on board the hijacked ships: quite an innovative approach for an insurgent group.

The present article uses the case study method to analyze the change in the digital propaganda strategies of the Houthi movement in the past three decades. Key aspects of the rebels' online content are presented. Actually, it can be argued that the Houthis are one of the most forward-looking insurgent groups in the region as they have developed different types of media channels throughout the years: from printed leaflets to an official TV station to official accounts on various social networking platforms. Their propaganda strategies also transformed themselves in the past decades and successfully adapted to the requirements and expectations of the contemporary digital media ecosystem. The article outlines the key stages in the transformation processes of the above-mentioned propaganda dissemination strategy.

Key characteristics of the Houthi movement

The Houthis refer to themselves as “Ansar Allah”, which can be translated as “God’s helpers”. The origins of the movement can be traced to the members of the Houthi tribe in Yemen, who were linked to the religious and cultural revival of the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam. Significant change was brought up in the early 2000s, when a charismatic leader, Hussein al-Houthi, transformed the group into a rebel force fighting Yemen’s autocratic, U.S.-backed government.¹

According to their own perceptions, the Houthis are an anti-imperialist force that battles against corruption and foreign influence (especially one coming from the USA and their allies). Their slogan confirms this as it contains the phrase “Death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews”. In the 1990s, the Houthis came forward as a theological movement known for their popular Zaidi religious lectures that sustain Hussein al-Houthi’s sermons in closed spaces such as mosques and summer camps.

In 2014, the rebel movement found a very interesting and quite an unexpected ally in the face of the Yemen’s recently deposed president. The same presi-

¹ NEREIM, Vivian. Honed at Home in Yemen, Houthi Propaganda Is Going Global. New York Times [online], 24.01.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/24/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-propaganda.html>

dent that the group had fought for years. The unlikely allies managed to enter into the country's capital Sana'a and oust the ruling government. As a result, Saudi Arabia formed an Arab military coalition attempting to remove the Houthi officials – it led to years long bombing campaign in Yemen during which thousands of its citizens died of fighting, hunger and disease.² The movement's uprising was largely peaceful, but the group adopted the strategy to continue their military expansion under the guise of fighting corruption. "The civil war in Yemen has resulted in an ongoing economic and humanitarian crisis where nearly 80% of the population is in need of international assistance."³

However, the Houthis survived the war against the Arab coalition (and it should be noted that the coalition was supplied with American weaponry and assistance) and even succeeded in establishing an iron fist. "They now present themselves as the legitimate government in Yemen, ignoring the internationally recognized government that operates largely in exile."⁴

Currently, the Houthis' "nation" can be described as a proto-state. Their officials are not recognized by the international community as legitimate leaders, but they still exercise near-total autonomy in the territories they control, which can be seen through their monopolistic hold of their territory's education, economic and media infrastructure.⁵ Eleftheriadou points out that proto-states are territorial clusters within a larger state that "contest the right of central authorities to govern, raising competing claims to authority and popular representation."⁶ "Within the Houthi proto-state, however, lies a dizzying array of local kinship and tribal networks that predate the existence of Yemen as a country, which have been competed for territory and influence in the region since the area was first settled."⁷

Nowadays, the Houthis stand again in the spotlight of international politics – especially after the beginning of the war in Gaza on 7 October, 2023. The movement's leaders (successfully) present themselves as the only Arab group

² NEREIM, Vivian. Honed at Home in Yemen, Houthi Propaganda Is Going Global. New York Times [online], 24.01.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/24/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-propaganda.html>

³ BLOMBERG, Charlie. The Proxy Goes Both Ways: Digital Propaganda of Yemen's Houthi Movement. *The Ramerican*, 2022, vol. 7, p. 66.

⁴ NEREIM, Vivian. Honed at Home in Yemen, Houthi Propaganda Is Going Global. New York Times [online], 24.01.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/24/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-propaganda.html>

⁵ SALMONI, B. A.; LOIDOLT, B.; WELLS, M. Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Houthi Phenomenon. Santa Monica: Arlington: RAND, 2010, p. 217.

⁶ ELEFTHERIADOU, M. Non-state Armed Actors and Contested Sovereignties in Internationalized Civil Wars: The case of Yemen's Civil War (2015-). *International Politics*, 2023, Vol. 60, pp. 134-153. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00279-3>

⁷ BLOMBERG, Charlie. The Proxy Goes Both Ways: Digital Propaganda of Yemen's Houthi Movement. *The Ramerican*, 2002, vol. 7, 2022, p. 73

willing to take on Israel and the imperial might of the United States. The group used the sense of impotency by many Arabs, who are desperate to stop the atrocities in Gaza. According to Hisham Al-Omeisy, a Yemeni political analyst who was imprisoned by the Houthis in 2017, the activists have “pitched themselves as the highly moral, credible, real heroes, if you will – of not just Arabs, but humanity in general.”⁸

As the conflict in Gaza continues, the popularity of the Houthis across the Middle East has grown tangibly fueled by the grief on behalf of Palestinians and the fury at Israel’s actions.

Outlining the key aspects of the Houthi movement can’t ignore the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the group’s actions – especially in the light of recent events. Scholars and international relations specialists share the view that it becomes quite clear that Iran lends support to the Houthis in terms of weapons, logistics support, and training.⁹ However, many scholars also argue this participation in Houthis’ politics is relatively low, and significantly less than the support lent to Hadi forces by Saudi Arabia.¹⁰ There aren’t significant information and analysis, however, of the degree to which the Islamic Republic offers support to the Yemeni group in the creation and dissemination of political propaganda.

The Houthis’ digital media strategy

On 19 November, 2023, the Houthis managed to capture the Israel linked cargo vessel *Galaxy leader*. This was announced by movement’s activists themselves with a high-quality video posted on a Houthi-owned TV channel. The clip showed armed activists making a dramatic landing on the ship from a helicopter, brandishing their weapons and taking all 25 crew members hostage. The video quickly became viral on social networks. Fahmli Albaheth, an independent digital rights defender and tech expert, admits: “Be it graphics, videos or audio messages, the Houthis’ online messaging is all produced and executed at a very high-level quality.”¹¹ The Houthis’ leaders even allowed social networks influencers to board “*Galaxy leader*” and to post content they created there online. Both

⁸ NEREIM, Vivian. Honed at Home in Yemen, Houthi Propaganda Is Going Global. *New York Times* [online], 24.01.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/24/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis-propaganda.html>

⁹ SHARP, J. M. Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. Congressional Research Service, 2021, p. 10

¹⁰ TRANSFELD, M. Iran’s small hand in Yemen. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* [online], 14.02.2017 [viewed 27.09.2024]. Available from: <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988>

¹¹ MOHSEN, Rashid. The Houthi’s Media Machine Is Going Global. *Foreign Policy* [online]. 27.03.2024. [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/27/houthis-yemen-social-media-israel-hamas-gaza-war-red-sea-attacks>

official and influencer content can be found in English and Arabic. In a way, the vessel transformed into a tourist attraction in Yemen. The crew remains in captivity and is “treated in accordance with Islamic values.”¹²

The Houthis’ Red Sea seizures and increased social networks content boosted the movement’s reputation resulting in high numbers of recruited members. “For the Houthis, “linking [Red Sea] attacks to the support of Gaza is a reliable way to amass support”, said Maysara Shija al-Deen, a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies think tank.”¹³ Her colleague, Maged Al-Madhaji, however, think that the successful recruitment is more closely linked to the sympathy for the people in Palestine and less to the popularity of the Houthi movement as vast members of Yemenis are still not in favor of the group.¹⁴

Houthi leaders and activists clearly understand very well the importance of a group’s presence in media for the dissemination of their ideas and its popularization among the general public for the gain of supporters. Media have played a significant role in the movement’s strategies since its inception. The versatile media presence of the Houthis can be argued as one of the characteristics that separate them from the other Islamist rebel groups.

Since its formation, the Houthi movement has undergone many transformations. It evolved from a closed religious group with few followers, through a larger social movement to a ruling force in civil-war-ridden Yemen and to an internationally recognized presence in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. One thing has been consistent through all the years of the group’s development: its leaders are highly aware of the possibilities offered by a broad media presence and the dissemination of propaganda. Members of the group have captured these possibilities: the Houthis operate both through traditional media and through different online communication channels. Their online presence resembles strongly the one of ISIS, whose members were also well acquainted with the benefits of going digital.

Hussein al-Houthi and his supporters realized quite early that the closed sermons were actually not very effective. They moved toward a policy of media propaganda with the hope of promotion of a revival in Zaidism, a strand of Shia Islam native to Yemen, and build a platform for the new ideology. The sermons were recorded and those recordings were disseminated through the Sa’ada

¹² MOHSEN, Rashid. The Houthi’s Media Machine Is Going Global. Foreign Policy [online], 27.03.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/27/houthis-yemen-social-media-israel-amas-gaza-war-red-sea-attacks>

¹³ MOHSEN, Rashid. The Houthi’s Media Machine Is Going Global. Foreign Policy [online], 27.03.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/27/houthis-yemen-social-media-israel-amas-gaza-war-red-sea-attacks>

¹⁴ MOHSEN, Rashid. The Houthi’s Media Machine Is Going Global. Foreign Policy [online], 27.03.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/27/houthis-yemen-social-media-israel-amas-gaza-war-red-sea-attacks>

governorate (initially) – the group’s mountainous heartland in Northwest Yemen. The Northern governorates of Yemen were flooded by leaflets (called *malazem*), which contained transcripts of Al-Houthi’s political and religious lectures combined with his interpretations of the Quran. According to the sermons and leaflets, Al-Houthi’s followers were depicted as an oppressed minority with beliefs deeply rooted in the country’s history. Zaidism as a form of belief has existed in Yemen since the 9th century. Hussein al-Houthi, his brother Mohammed al-Houthi and their supporters were in favor of a Zaidi religious and cultural revival partly in response to Zaidism’s lack of significance in the last five decades of the 20th century. Their views transformed themselves into a narrative of Zaidi marginalization. The activists believed Zaidi Islam’s “pure” roots in Yemen but they were routinely sidelined by political and religious majorities. And so the image of the Houthis as an oppressed group became a central point to their media presence.

Another inherent part in the Houthis’ self-image and their messages is their stance as strugglers not only against local opponents but also against global forces. This concept found the basis for the group’s slogan, which can roughly be translated as “God is great; death to America; death to Israel; a curse to the Jews; victory for Islam”, which can be linked both to Hezbollah’s motto and to the messages of the Iranian Revolution. “This resemblance hints at the linkage of inspiration and support from Shia groups in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region with Iran – which, with the Houthis, form part of the “Axis of Resistance”, portraying themselves as opponents of Israel and the United States and defenders against Western domination.”¹⁵

Before the conflict in Gaza of 2023, the Houthis focused primarily on their domestic issues rather on the international scene (of course, with the exception of the strikes against targets in Saudi Arabia). That changed on 19 November, 2023, when the activists began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, which they alleged were affiliated with Israel. On 13 April, 2024, the Houthis launched drones against Israel in coordination with Iran and other regional proxies. The official Houthi propaganda presented these attacks as an act of solidarity with Palestinians facing the Israeli assault on Gaza. These actions also led the United States to re-designate the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity (which is not the stricter category of Foreign Terrorist Organization – FTO, due to concerns around the implications for aid provisions in Yemen).¹⁶

¹⁵ BURHAN, Ahmed. Houthi Media: A Study in Ideological Warfare. Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies [online], 02.06.2024, pp. 4-6 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22797>

¹⁶ Institute for Strategic Dialogue. The Houthi (Ansar Allah) Digital Ecosystem. Institute for Strategic Dialogue [online], 28.05.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/the-houthi-ansar-allah-digital-ecosystem

Iran's involvement in the Houthi movement is consistent with their operation with Hezbollah and other militant groups in the Middle East, where creating antagonism between varying groups can “badger, distract and waste the resources of its enemies.”¹⁷ Still, it can be argued that the Houthis are a useful tool for the Islamic Republic only if they are actively in direct conflict with Saudi Arabia. The evidence is the more tangible support lent by Iran since the seizures of vessels by the Houthis in Red Sea.

Key factor in the mobilization of support for the Houthi movement are the high levels of poverty in Yemen: a reason that mobilized many people who didn't necessarily share the Zaidi faith to rebel against the internationally recognized political regime in the country. The Houthi leaders made quick use of the public's significant levels of dissatisfaction with the officials.

The Houthis used different media channels to introduce their adoption of the wilayah – a theological and political concept broadly meaning the power of authority held by an individual community or government to describe a divine right to lead the country politically and religiously.¹⁸

The Houthis' television channel, Al-Masirah, was founded in 2012 and functions as an all-encompassing media hub for the movement.¹⁹

Throughout the years since the popularization of the Houthi movements it has become clear that their propaganda is remarkably adaptive and often gives (useful) insight into the group's overall military and political strategies. During all those years the activists have written and rewritten their messages so they better reflect the shifting political environment (both domestic and international) and the successes or losses of the group on the battlefield. However, there isn't a complete departure from the group's core messages. The main enemies are still Saudi Arabia and the United States and the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Even at time of peaceful negotiations for ending of the war activities between the Houthis and Riyadh, the rebel movement still post anti-Saudi commentaries and messages online – with a special focus on videos and images showing the devastation brought by Saudi-led coalition's airstrikes over Yemen. The emergence of such imagery led specialists to think that the Houthis were

¹⁷ JOHNSTON, T.; LANE, M.; CASEY, A.; WILLIAMS, H.; RHOADES, A.; SLADDEN, J.; VEST, N.; REIMER, J.; HABERMAN, R. Could the Houthis be the next Hizballah? Iranian proxy development in Yemen and the future of the Houthi movement [online]. Santa Monica: Arlington: RAND, 2020, p. 64. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.7249/rr2551>

¹⁸ BURHAN, Ahmed. Houthi Media: A Study in Ideological Warfare. Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies [online], 02.06.2024, p. 13 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/22797>

¹⁹ PORTER, Hannah. A Battle of Hearts and Minds: The Growing Media Footprint of Yemen's Houthis. Gulf International Forum [online], 04.06.2020 [viewed 27.09.2024]. Available from: <https://gulfi.org/a-battle-of-hearts-and-minds-the-growing-media-footprint-of-yemens>

after significant repartitions for war damages from Saudi Arabia and used the opportunity of negotiations to secure them.²⁰

It's important to note that the Houthis are highly aware of the possibilities of propaganda dissemination through the communication channels of the so called new media. To reach broader urban audience, the activists post regularly on social networks using hashtags. They share videos, retweet both announcements from their leaders and messages from opposing politicians (and disregard the views of the latter with accusations of espionage for foreign countries and disruptive work against the Yemenis). Using social networks, the Houthis can appeal to the younger parts of the Yemeni population as they are more technologically literate and more likely to use those platforms. All of this demonstrates the Houthis' investment in these channels for strategic messaging.

A useful tool for the dissemination of the Houthis' videos is their website *ansarallah.net*, where can be found updates in the battlefield actions, published essays with the messages of the group's leaders and different types of digital content. Actually, the website can illustrate a common theme within Houthi propaganda and Islamist iconography, where human suffering is represented as both a political catalyst and as an object of anesthetization.²¹ For example, the image of an injured or dead child represents the purity of God being unjustly marred by violence, creating the need for vengeance against "the guilty others" who were responsible for it.²² "In this manner, violence against children is portrayed as both a political and religious call to action, urging all Muslims and Yemenis to enact justice against a godless foe."²³ For Joap van Ginneken the sharing of violent images represents a moral conflict: the collective opinion can be readily manipulated by the knowledge of a perceived injustice, leading to a self-sustaining "spiral of violence" that justifies itself as it gains momentum.²⁴ Actually, imagery of death is common for the Islamist media messages. The Houthis' media content uses often the martyrdom in the name of a broader religious conflict: both through an active role (via fighting) or a passive one (civilians' deaths). The movement's propaganda aligns itself with Islam as a political and rhetorical tool. "In this manner, the Houthis' use of Islamic symbols in both their imagery and messaging

²⁰ PORTER, Hannah. A Battle of Hearts and Minds: The Growing Media Footprint of Yemen's Houthis. *Gulf International Forum* [online], 04.06.2020 [viewed 27.09.2024]. Available from: <https://gulfi.org/a-battle-of-hearts-and-minds-the-growing-media-footprint-of-yemens>

²¹ GRUBER, C.; HAUGBOLLE, S. (Eds.). *Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013, p. 117.

²² GRUBER, C., HAUGBOLLE, S. (Eds.). *Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric of the Image*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013, p. 118.

²³ BLOMBERG, Charlie. *The Proxy Goes Both Ways: Digital Propaganda of Yemen's Houthi Movement*. *The Ramerican*, 2002, vol. 7, p. 86.

²⁴ GINNEKEN, J.V. *Collective Behavior and Public Opinion: Rapid Shifts in Opinion and Communication*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003, p. 202.

allows them to construct a reality in which their cause is synonymous with that of Islam itself. Even though the direct enemies of the Houthis on the ground are Muslim themselves, religious rhetoric contributes to a body of symbols that seeks to redefine spirituality, citizenship, and duty through the Houthi cause.”²⁵

Even before the war in Gaza of 2023, the Houthi movement’s imagery presents the United States and Israel as key enemies to the group’s cause – ignoring the fact that USA are only tangentially involved in the Yemeni Civil War and Israel has no substantive connection to that internal struggle.

ISD analysts managed to find 98 accounts linked to the Houthi movement during the period of January - February 2024. Of them, 60 entities are official – and 38 – informal. They included 12 websites, 41 accounts on X (Twitter), 22 Telegram channels, 9 Facebook accounts, 9 TikTok accounts, 1 Instagram account, 3 YouTube accounts and 1 account on Iranian social network platform Virasty. The ISD’s work was meant to give an indicative overview of the group’s online presence.²⁶

According to the ISD’s data, Houthi official accounts were active primarily on X (30 out of 41 accounts) and Telegram (16 of 23 channels). Support accounts were active on Instagram, Facebook, TikTok and YouTube as well as on X and Telegram. “All websites and more than a quarter of social media accounts were classed as official media outlets affiliated with the Houthis.”²⁷ Media outlets affiliated with the group were not found to exist on TikTok and YouTube and on Facebook can be found evidence that some of the explicitly pro-Houthi accounts have been removed.

The content on these channels was mainly presented in Arabic, although some of them were also available in English (one of the websites was even available in Hebrew). The different websites have different roles. Some platforms were aimed at domestic or regional audiences and others – at the international public. Some pages contained mostly religious themes while others were exclusively news related. The official website of Ansar Allah was originally hosted on a German server until it was shut down in February 2024. However, an alternative version could be found online within days. All of the above “indicates that while most of the accounts in the ecosystem were aimed at domestic or regional Ara-

²⁵ BLOMBERG, Charlie. *The Proxy Goes Both Ways: Digital Propaganda of Yemen’s Houthi Movement*. The Rameican, 2022, Vol. 7, p. 77.

²⁶ Institute for Strategic Dialogue. *The Houthi (Ansar Allah) Digital Ecosystem*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue [online], 28.05.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: https://www.isdgglobal.org/digital_dispatches/the-houthi-ansar-allah-digital-ecosystem

²⁷ Institute for Strategic Dialogue. *The Houthi (Ansar Allah) Digital Ecosystem*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue [online], 28.05.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: https://www.isdgglobal.org/digital_dispatches/the-houthi-ansar-allah-digital-ecosystem

bic-speaking audiences, there were official efforts to reach a wider international audience and adapt to moderation efforts.”²⁸

The social networks that are based in the United States (such as X, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube) officially prohibit the existence of accounts of terrorist organizations and accounts disseminating terrorist content but have some flexibility when defining the term “terrorist”. In that way, those platforms are obliged to remove all content from FTOs but the companies appear to treat SDGT designation as less definitive in its implications.²⁹ Such inconsistent international response to the Houthi movement presents a significant problem emerging in social networks, where explicit Houthi accounts and content are inconsistently moderated. “Without clearer designation and policy approaches, an unhelpful grey area will endure, and the Houthi digital ecosystem and audience will continue to proliferate.”³⁰

Conclusions

Even before the onset of the Israel-Palestine conflict in October 2023, the activists of the Houthi movement were quite familiar with the opportunities offered by digital media for spreading their ideas and gathering followers. Their online campaigns became even more intensive after November 2023 when the rebels hijacked several commercial vessels and attracted social networks influencers to spread the information about their activities.

The Houthis’ digital media presence is an example for a successful strategy for the spread of propaganda online. Their messages evolved from religious sermons in front of a limited group of listeners to political content available on various media channels. Another peculiarity of the movement’s online presence is that the content is available not only in their native language but also in English and Hebrew - the languages of the rebels’ “archenemies” (the United States and Israel).

The Houthis’ online presence presents a potential issue for the owners and administrators of social networks because of the existence of a “gray area” for the regulation of insurgent groups that are not classified as terrorist organizations but

²⁸ Institute for Strategic Dialogue. The Houthi (Ansar Allah) Digital Ecosystem. Institute for Strategic Dialogue [online], 28.05.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/the-houthi-ansar-allah-digital-ecosystem

²⁹ Institute for Strategic Dialogue. The Houthi (Ansar Allah) Digital Ecosystem. Institute for Strategic Dialogue [online], 28.05.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/the-houthi-ansar-allah-digital-ecosystem

³⁰ Institute for Strategic Dialogue. The Houthi (Ansar Allah) Digital Ecosystem. Institute for Strategic Dialogue [online], 28.05.2024 [viewed 27.08.2024]. Available from: https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/the-houthi-ansar-allah-digital-ecosystem

still pose a threat to the international security. Stricter forms of regulations need to be considered for the official and supporters' accounts of such rebel movements online.

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